Jumpkick Identified
I wrote here about what I might do, if I were Kyle Rittenhouse’s lawyer and the State revealed to me the identity of Jumpkick Man:
In part:
If I know who Jumpkick is, I know who his friends and family are. I start interviewing them to find out what Jumpkick has said about that night. What he told them may be admissible without him having to come into court.
(Comment on cellphone records in trial, below the payline.)
According to this site, the prosecution advised the defense of Jumpkick Man’s identity on November 11th.
This report on the same site (so consider the source) claims that Jumpkick’s ex-wife said that:
[Jumpkick] posted on Facebook shortly before the shooting, writing, as she recalled it, “@Team Reese, let’s kill that white boy” with emojis of a gun and coffin. [Jumpkick]’s nickname is Reese, which is verified by his Facebook pages.
All’s well that ends well, but was Huber or Grosskreutz in communication with Jumpkick that evening, conspiring to “kill that white boy”? If I were the defense, I’d sure have wanted to know, and the cellphone records probably would have told me.
The big question now, for figuring out how badly Thomas Binger screwed up, is when Binger told the defense Jumpkick’s identity. Because all ended well for the defense, and Binger isn’t talking to the press, we’ll probably have to get used to not knowing.
All ends well.
People upset about Rittenhouse being acquitted are hopeful that he will be prosecuted federally. A Democratic representative from New Jersey has called for DOJ review “of the not guilty verdict.”
Rittenhouse was a juvenile (for purposes of federal law, under 18) at the time of the shootings. Juvenile prosecutions are very rare in federal court, because they are very difficult. The chances that Rittenhouse will be prosecuted are next to nil, but if Rittenhouse were prosecuted as a juvenile, the prosecution would not be public.
On the other side, people happy about Rittenhouse being acquitted are hopeful that he will sue everyone who said mean things about him. They compare him to Nick Sandmann, whom they think got $250,000,000 from the media for saying mean things about him.
Sandmann certainly did not get a nine-figure settlement. He probably didn’t get a six-figure settlement. His lawyer, Lin Wood, was intent on keeping the settlement amount confidential, which he wouldn’t have been if the amount weren’t embarrasing to him; Sandmann fired Wood, which he wouldn’t have done if Wood had gotten him a huge payday. Rittenhouse’s defamation claims are not worth any more than Sandmann’s.
In light of the fact that an eighteen-year-old boy should be out in a convertible bird-doggin' chicks and bangin' beaver, instead of hanging around with lawyers, I propose that the Left pretend that Rittenhouse has been prosecuted federally as a juvenile, that the Right pretend that Rittenhouse has secured a zillion-dollar confidential settlement from Joe Biden, and that everyone leave the poor kid alone.
Chrystul Kizer
Turn your attention to the case of Chrystul Kizer, who is also being prosecuted by the Kenosha County DA’s Office for murdering the man who she says sex-trafficked her. The issue in the case is whether she gets the benefit of Wisconsin’s sex-trafficking-coercion law, which provides:
A victim of [sex trafficking] has an affirmative defense for any offense committed as a direct result of the [sex trafficking] without regard to whether anyone was prosecuted or convicted for the [sex trafficking].
After a judge held pretrial that she could not have that benefit, she appealed, and the court of appeals held that, yes, perhaps Kizer’s jury can be instructed on the coercion defense:
In determining whether a jury should be instructed on whether the commission of a
particular offense by a trafficking victim is a “direct result” of “the violation of
[WIS. STAT. §§] 940.302(2) or 948.051,” a court should consider whether there is
“some evidence” to support such a finding based on whether the victim’s offense
arises relatively immediately from the trafficking violation of which the victim is a
victim, is motivated primarily by the trafficking violation, is a logical and
reasonably foreseeable consequence of that violation, and is not in significant part
caused by events, circumstances or considerations other than that violation.
The State thinks that the killing was not a direct result of the trafficking:
Graveley contends that the case is not about trafficking, but about an intentional homicide. Revealing some of the evidence he would present to a jury, Graveley has stated in court that in days before the murder, Kizer told a friend that she would soon be the owner of a BMW.
Once at Volar’s home, Graveley said, Kizer sent texts that appear to show she was waiting for the right moment to use the gun she brought to the home, saying “I’m finna do it.” She posted a selfie from the house captioned “My Mug Shot.” In the minutes after a neighbor heard the sound of a gunshot coming from the house, Graveley said, Kizer appeared to download a police scanner app on her phone.
“None of that, judge — none of that — is self-defense,” Graveley argued at a February 2020 hearing. “All of the motives I’ve just described are motives consistent with a person who is committing an intentional homicide.”
First, the coercion defense is not about “self-defense.” Second, Graveley presents a false dichotomy. The killing could be both an intentional homicide, and “about”—a direct result of—trafficking. Kizer could have felt herself entirely out of danger (so that there was no need for self-defense) and murdered her trafficker and stolen his BMW in sheer coldblooded retribution, and the coercion defense would still apply, because she wouldn’t have killed him if not for the trafficking.
The burden of production on this coercion defense—the obligation to provide some evidence that the defense applies—is on the defense. Production of some evidence then shifts the burden of proof to the State, which must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was not “committed as a direct result of” the sex trafficking.
The State may think that the murder was not directly related to the trafficking, but if the Court of Appeals opinion stands they don’t know whether the jury will get the coercion instruction (likely it will) nor whether they will be able to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not a direct result of the trafficking (likely they won’t).
In other words, the Court of Appeals puts them in a position where, if they go to trial, they are likely going to lose. It motivates them to make a deal with a defendant who has already expressed sincere apologies:
“I’m not looking to walk out of your courtroom with nothing. I come to you and Randall’s family with a sincere heart of apologies for what I have done,” Kizer wrote to [Judge] Wilk from jail in March 2020.
Now that everyone knows that the State is probably going to lose a trial (probably, but not certainly) everyone can agree to a plea that gives the State an ounce of flesh and lets Kizer, who killed a guy who probably needed killing anyway, get on with her life.
So of course the State is appealing to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to try to overturn the Court of Appeals opinion. This is just how prosecutors behave.